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Developing a Theologically Self-Reflexive
Critique with Comparative Theologians
and the Sociological Analysis of
Pierre Bourdieii
Colby

Dickinson

In this article I attempt to locate productive foundations for a critical
theological methodology through engaging with both the inherently critical nature
of comparative theology alongside the sociological, self reflexive analysis of Pierre
Bourdieu. I turn, first, to comparative theology because it is a field with a heightened sensibility for how self-reflexive critique fiinctions within a theological context,
as it assumes that both sides in any conversation maintain the possibility of
re-examining their own premises and foundations. I turn, second, to the work of
the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu because it is his analysis of symbolic poiver that
provides an examination of self reflexive structures of understanding that might
further assist theologians, comparative or not, to take up a critical theology from
within the established traditions that constitute the field of theology proper. My
argument is that theology has been beholden for far too long, centuries in fact, to
non self reflexive structures of inquiiy. From our current vantage point, only a selfreflexive, critical theology can properly endeavor to be a t h e o l o g i c a l investigation,
as this is the only way to understand the outplaying of the confessional content of
the theological tradition.
Abstract. —

Prelude
From the commentaries o f Saint John o f Avila on the Psalms, we hear
this spiritual advice: "This is the order to follow w i t h regard to the
psalm's command to see: first, look at yourself; then at God; and then
at your neighbor."' Sin, of course, and as Saint John notes, clouds any
attempt at gaining 'self-knowledge', and can only be overcome by
addressing not just one's past sins, but those committed every day.^

1. John o f Avila, Audi, filia - Listen,
(New York; Paullst Press, 2006), 175.
2. Ibid., 186.

0 Daughter,

trans. Joan Frances Gormiey
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A responsibility to the present is born within this line o f sight. Examining the self, however, as Saint John also sees, can often lead to "great
sadness, distrust, and faint heartedness."^ The cost of self-reflexive
knowledge is measured by the loss o f a certain security, in happiness, in
trust and in 'strong heartedness'. But there is no other way to progress
in the spiritual life; of this truth many saints are certain. Within the life
called Christian, a turn to Christ becomes a necessary movement o f
abiding in faith, and the first step can be found in the penance undertaken for one's sins.^
What Saint John o f Avila points the believer toward is no less a
paradigm for the spiritual life than it is for the theological understanding. As Carl Raschke has described the context in which we are living
theologically, we need a critical, or what I am calling a self-reflexive,
theology more than ever in our current global order.^ Yet such a perspective is often noticeably lacking, leading theologians to make numerous
alliances with political ideologies that not only threaten the basis o f any
ecclesial community, but also inhibit Christians from engaging with, as
Saint John described it, the necessary first step in one's spiritual maturation: recognizing the sin that lies, either active or latent, within one's
self-knowledge.
We have often heard i t said that Jesus was highly critical o f the
powers that be, of those structures and institutions in which he was
raised and in which he both lived his life and established his ministry.
As such, it is perhaps not much of a stretch to suggest that he promoted
what many would consider to be a healthily self-critical understanding
of his religious identity. I do not mean to suggest that Jesus himself was
somehow flawed or sinful and so needed to be critiqued for an errant
perspective o f himself; rather, I suggest that he seems to have deliberately
placed an emphasis on cleaning up his own (i.e. his Father's) house
(as a form o f self-identification) and to have adapted his actions accordingly based on a critical reflection o f those within his own religious tradition. Theologically, the very centrality o f the practice (the sacrament
even) of confessing one's own sin, but also as they are somehow situated
structurally within the history o f Christianity, would seem to indicate
that the inherent role o f self-critique within Christianity is a central
principle in living one's life o f faith. I t is illustrated too by those

3. John o f Avila, . 4 K a ' y , / / M , 199.
4. Ibid., 210.
5. Carl A . Raschke, Critical Theology: hnroducing
Crisis (Downers Grove, I L : InterVarsity Press, 2016).
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provocative readings o f scriptiire that allow us to see how even Jesus, in
the Garden of Gethsemane, for example, probed the depths of God's
own being, demonstrating some level of self-awareness as a form of selfreflexive critique. A t the very least, there is certainly a profound and
complex relation to the self that Christianity calls for in asking people
to die to themselves (e.g. Romans 6:6) that promotes a robust cause for
self-examination, as Kierkegaard once put it.'^
The point of departure for any genuine confession of one's complicity in sinful structures becomes more difficult to establish, however,
when we stop to consider what it means to be self-reflexively aware in
explicitly theological terms. That is, how exactly do we form and maintain what could be called a self-reflexive (critical) theology? Unfortunately, the history of theology tells us that it is no easier to perform such
a critique in theological terms than it is for any other discipline, though
the seeds for self-examination should perhaps be that much easier to
access given the stories and practices within both scripture and tradition
that call theologians to take account of their words and actions so that
they might be set upon the right path.
In what follows I attempt to locate productive foundations for a
critical theological methodology through engaging with both the inherently critical nature of comparative theology alongside the sociological,
self-reflexive analysis of Pierre Bourdieu. M y argument is essentially that
theology has been beholden for far too long, centuries in fact, to non
self-reflexive structures of inquiry - paths that allowed the theologian to
abstract themselves from the arguments they were making. Because of
this, and from our current vantage point, only a self-reflexive theology
can properly be a theological investigation, as this is the only way to
understand the outplaying of the confessional content of the theological
tradition, as noted in the prelude above. Put simply, theology needs to
become more attentive to exactly how it is to manifest a particular form
of self-critique in the modern period beyond merely capitulating to a
particular form of abstracted rationality. Indeed, as I hope to show, our
access to something like grace might just depend on this movement
toward greater self-awareness. In pursuit of a self-critical theology, and
in league with numerous contextual theologies, though here proceeding
solely from comparative theological and sociological points of view,
I believe theologians must not shy away from those social, political and
philosophical analyses that could better inform the field of theology
6. Saren Kierkegaard, For Self-Examination,
ed. and trans. H o w a r d V. H o n g and
Edna H . H o n g (Princeton, N J : Princeton University Press, 1990).
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and its practices in order to more accurately observe and critique its all
too frequently uncontested methods and models.''
As will soon unfold, I turn first to comparative theology i n this
context because it is a field w i t h a heightened sensibility for how selfreflexive critique functions within a theological context, as it assumes
that both sides in any conversation maintain the possibility o f re-examining their own premises and foundations. I turn, second, to the work
of Pierre Bourdieu because it is his sociological analysis of symbolic
power that provides an examination of self-reflexive structures o f understanding that might further assist theologians, comparative or not, to
take up a critical theology from within the established traditions that
constitute the field of theology proper.

Comparative Theology as Self-refliexive Theological Praxis
Because my approach to the formation o f a self-reflexive model for theological inquiry is inherently comparative (in this instance explicitly
involving political, social, philosophical and cultural methods o f critique), I want to begin m y assessment o f the 'rubble' o f theology - a
term I borrow from Peter Admirand who utilizes the term in his survey
of the fragmented field o f theology today^ - by turning to comparative
theology. Though in many ways it is not the central focus o f the present
study, but rather a strong partner wich what I am here undertaking,
comparative theology, or a theological field chat begins with the assumption that dialogue w i t h what appears as 'other' has the power to alter
one's own foundations and beliefs, is instrumental for any critical theological undertaking. Since I want to inspect the ways in which theology
can divest itself of power and privilege in order to flow more seamlessly
into other academic fields, subfields and disciplines i n general, I begin
with a motion toward comparative theology because it is, among all
theological fields, particularly and methodologically attentive to the
porousness of theological inquiry i n ways that previous theologies have
not been. I find recent comparative approaches particularly helpful as

7. See Klaus Scholder, The Birth of Modern Critical Theology: Origins and Problems
of Biblical Criticism in the Seventeenth Century, trans. John Bowden (London: S C M
Press, 1990).
8. Perer A d m i r a n d , Amidst Mass Atrocity and the Rubble of Theology: Searching for
a Viable Theology (Eugene, O R : Cascade, 2012). This fragmented field o f theology for
Admirand stems, i n part, f r o m the many sources o f contemporary theology (e.g. contextual, systematic, pastoral, biblical, liturgical, ethical and so forth).
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they have the ability to incorporate political and social analysis as part
of their elaboration of ever more creative methods and models for the
articulation of theological insight.' I n this particular context, I want to
make use of the work o f the comparative theologian Hugh Nicholson
before linking his work to a more robust depiction o f the 'rubble' of
theology that is left to us today and that lies underneath any truly critical
theology - 'rubble' that might just, i n the end, prove to be the only
building blocks worth assembling into something we might find to be
usable.
In short, comparative theology has offered theological inquiry on
the whole an opportunity to delve into its own (revealed) foundations
by not only entering into dialogue with other religious traditions, but by
turning any insight gained through inter-religious dialogue back upon
its own claims and beliefs, presenting the theologian engaged in such
conversation with more than simply hermeneutical nuance. They are
rather presented with the opportunity for self-transformation through
the confession o f their faith and their religious failings at the same time.
T o admit this possibility o f transformation is at the same time, as I will
discuss later more fully, to admit the inherently political elements
embedded within already established theological doctrines and traditions. By starting from this premise, comparative theology allows its
practitioners to put themselves 'at risk', so to speak, in order that personal and communal self-understanding might be a dynamic and transformative experience, not simply an academic conclusion.
What I find especially intriguing in Nicholson's assemblage o f the
political and the theological in the service of comparative theology comes
in the form o f his tackling the issue o f self-reflexiveness through an
emphasis placed on the task of 'denaturalizing' as a contestation of currently existing political portraits o f nature.'" By taking a different
approach to the political uses of the belabored concept of the 'natural'

9. See, for example, Francis X . Clooney, Comparative TIjeology: Deep Learning
across Religious Borders ( O x f o r d : Wiley-Blackwell, 2010). I am particularly struck, as
well, by the way i n which interreligious dialogue can help f r u i t f u l l y develop a more
'vulnerable theology', as it is termed by Marianne Moyaert i n her In Response to the
Religious Other: Ricoeur and the Fragility of Interreligious Encounters (Lanham, M D :
Lexington, 2014).
10. H u g h Nicholson, Comparative Theology and the Problem of Religious Rivaby
( O x f o r d : O x f o r d University Press, 2011). For similar thematics i n his work, see his
recent article "Social Identit)' Processes i n the Development o f Maximally Counterintuitive Theological Concepts; Consubstantiality and No-Self," Journal of the American
Academy of Religion 82, 3 (2014); 736-770. See also Clooney, Comparative
Theology,
50-51.
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in religion, he is able to carefully and critically subvert the ways in which
identity itself is protected against ail difference through its establishment
as being itself 'natural'. He recognizes in this approach to 'nature' that
this is the starting point one must begin with i f one is to take seriously
the already constructed boundaries and borders which are legitimated as
'natural' by those defined by them and who often, in turn, defend their
existence.
Following closely the works o f both Karhryn Tanner and Daniel
Boyarin in particular, Nicholson presents a way for "faithfulness to the
W o r d of God" to move "against the formation o f sharp cultural
boundaries,"" exposing not just the problematic divisions between religious identities and traditions, but also the highly problematic existence
of disciplinary borders. Such insights progress, in fact, from the essence
of Christian proclamation which sought to eradicate the existence o f
exclusivism. Going back to the ever problematic division between Jews
and Christians, for example, he finds that: " [ . . . ] the doctrine o f Jesus
Christ as the W o r d o f God is deeply implicated in the history of JewishChristian apologetics and thus inseparable from the issue o f Christian
boundary formation."'^ T o think beyond the desire for such boundary
formations means by implication having to go back to the originary
impulse for identity itself and the way it is often 'grounded' in a point
of 'origin' for a religious tradition.
Just what exactly constitutes systematic theology and what interreligious dialogue becomes in this context somewhat of a moot point, as
comparative theology engages both most readily. Perhaps the breakdown
berween these divisions is, in this sense, for the best, as this breakdown
promotes a vulnerability thac might actually enable theology to dialogue
with other disciplines and other religions in ways it has never quice yec
done. What is remarkably clear however, is that the turn that Nicholson
takes, citing Tanner's work - and this is what I would like to highlight
as an incisive movement into the inherently self-reflexive nature of theological inquiry - is one made toward the "differences within cultures as
opposed to the differences among cultures."'^ In short, and to borrow
the language of Giorgio Agamben, who uses this phrase in the context
of Pauline thought,'^ we are presented with a 'division o f division itself,
11. Nicholson, Comparative Tloeology and the Problem of Religious Rivalry, 89.
12. Ibid., 90.
13. Ibid., 95. This idea is borrowed f r o m Kathryn Tanner, Theories of Culture:
A New Agenda for Theology (Minneapolis, M N : Fortress Press, 1997).
14. Giorgio Agamben, The Time that Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the
Romans, trans. Patricia Dailey (Stanford, C A : Stanford University Press, 2005).

D E V E L O P I N G A T H E O L O G I C A L L Y SELF-REFLEXIVE C R I T I Q U E

131

a self-critical mechanism that divides from within the cultural divisions
already present in our world. That is, the comparative approach that
theology needs to learn to adapt, by this reading o f things, is one that
looks outward only from the difference within itself, not necessarily the
difference external to it. Theology needs perhaps in this case to die to
itself before it can find new life, as the Gospels and Paul's letters had
phrased it, and no matter what such a thing may entail in the end for
the future and practice of theology (especially in a comparative sense).
Not only does such a move bring the contingent nature o f these boundaries to light, it also allows us to critique theology's historically hegemonic
engagements.'^
For his part, Nicholson is able to immediately turn such an insight
around, back on itself i n fact, in order to stress the political elements
at work within Christian constructions o f the self before engaging i n
the essential tasks o f comparative study. As he phrases it, "Conversely,
a demonstration o f the contingency and mutability o f cultural boundaries attenuates the essentializing characterizations o f self and other that
interfere with the recognition o f the multiplicity o f voices within each
cultural formation."'^ I n other words. Christians have been guilty more
or less throughout history o f silencing the 'multiplicity of voices' within
their oivn tradition in order to promote a particular, hegemonic narrative
of Christianity, likely i n a particular 'orthodox' version. It is not a far
leap in light of such an analysis to advocate for an anti-essentialist methodology of 'cross-cultural comparison' for today's globalized world that
focuses upon the 'political' elements centrally located, but also masked
within, theological practice in order to more justly consider any religious
identity that presents itself before us.''' We are witnesses in this procedure to methods o f cross-cultural comparison as they become forms o f
critical self-reflexive understanding.'^ The main point in all of this analysis is not that we necessarily begin with an external or internal critique
15. "The recognirion o f t h e internal diversity o f a cultural formation like Christianity reveals the largely contingent and arbitrary nature o f the cultural boundaries
delimiting it f r o m its surroundings. For [ . . . ] the differentials upon which such boundaries are founded invariably reflect hegemonic relations w i t h i n each o f rhe delimited formations." Nicholson, Comparative Theology and the Problem of Religious Rivaby, 95.
16. Ibid., 95.
17. See ibid., 13.
18. "The comparative juxtaposition o f cultural-religious formations sets up resonances berween the two whereby prominent features o f the one bring to light parallel
features o f the other that may have been suppressed by various hegemonic discourses,
whether those o f indigenous orthodoxies or chose o f Western scholarship. I n this way
cross-cultural comparison can bring to light parallels that cut across established cultural
boundaries, thus revealing the latter's arbitrariness and contingency." Ibid., 95.
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of our idendty, but that an internal critique must be the end goal, one
that demonstrates the difficult fracturing of identity that already lay
within us.
T o profit from this re-alignment of comparative inquiry that ends
up re-focusing on the internal shifts in identity, we must also recognize
that such an endeavor is not made in order to abandon the embeddedness o f a given tradition's theological foundations and its own efforts
roward forming an apologetics, but to try to yet locate, in Nicholson's
words, a "deconstructive moment of the dialectic o f identity," again,
within traditional religious structures and cultures.'' This is Nicholson's
subtle shift from attempting to 'depoiiticize' Christian identity to 'denaturalizing' it, which is a demonstrably political tactic in another
direction.^"
I am reminded at this point in my sketch of a comparative approach
of the controversial terrain of political theology, one that begins with
a critique o f self-identity, so that we might see not only the failures of
natural theology, but mainly of the highly problematic use of the category o f the 'natural' and the way in which it is almost inevitably accompanied by a defensive posturing that has no place within theological
reasoning.^' We see such a position brillianriy on display in the work of
H . Richard Niebuhr, for example.^^ I hear a similar voice o f caution in
those who would share in the impulse not to fear the secularization o f
our world (though not necessarily to embrace it either), but simply to
realize that identities are far more complex than we often represent them,
encompassing so many facets as to literally be unrepresentable in their
Cotality.^^ I am encouraged on this score as well to see political theology
and inter-religious dialogue not solely as mediators of an impasse within
theological methods, but as central ways o f 'doing theology' in the first
place, a shift in perspective that I believe has been going on for some
dme now, but is sdll long overdue in being seen as a significantly central
method of a more universal theological insight.
What I am discussing here specifically, and as I will relate to the
work of Pierre Bourdieu in a moment, concerns how the integration of

19. Nicholson, Comparative Tiieology and t/je Prol>/em of Religious Rival)y, 104.
20. Ibid., 12.
2 1 . See the way i n which denaturalization is dealt w i t h in Dawne M o o n , God, Sex
and Politics: Homosexuality and Everyday Theologies (Chicago, I L : University o f Chicago
Press, 2004), 2 3 1 .
22. O n removing the defensiveness f r o m theological discourse, see H . Richard
Niebuhr, The Meaning of Revelation (Louisville, K Y ; Westminster John Knox, 2006).
23. Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, M A ; Belknap Press, 2007).

D E V E L O P I N G A T H E O L O G I C A L L Y SELF-REFLEXIVE C R I T I Q U E

133

various fields and subfields o f theological inquiry might lead not to a
fortification of each religion's boundaries, but to an openness toward
each becoming vulnerable co the other, even at the risk of being swallowed up whole. Such a form o f ontological poverty, as I would call it,
could even be read as imploring each 'division' (e.g. ethical, systematic,
pastoral, sacramental, historical, biblical, etc.) to cede ground to the
other, and, moreover, to welcome the other (with their own unique
'methods' and focal points) into our midst. This would be not only an
exemplary manifestation o f hospitality, but also of bearing a form of love
that lets the other - to incorporate Levinas's language ~ take it hostage,
that lets itself be overcome.

Towards a 'Pathetic' Theology as Self-reflexive Theology
"What Nicholson is gesturing coward, I would argue, is a domain somewhat familiar to theological inquiiy over the past half-century or more.
It is a topography that goes under a variety o f labels, but which we more
or less discern at work in Abraham Joshua Heschel's 'pathetic' theology,^'*
John Caputo's 'weak' theology,^^ Dan Barber's recent attempts to depict
theology as permanently ' i n diaspora'^'' or Jiirgen Moltmann's reading
of Christianity as a form o f 'permanent iconoclasm'.^'' I think it is also
present in various shades within Dietrich Bonhoeffer's efforts to formulate a 'religionless Christianity'.'^^ I t is to the resonance that I sense
within these political theological efforts that I wish to turn, as the dialogue that ensues will hopefully open up a path we might walk more
fully along toward the ultimate poverty of theology.
In the wake of the Second W o r l d War and the Shoah, certain philosophical and theological trends began to take account o f the radical
alterity of the other in ways that had not been done before. Figures with
innmate knowledge o f the war and its effect upon the peoples of Europe
began to stake new territory in exploring just how 'otherness' itself - the
24. Abraham Heschel, The Prophets (New York: Harper, 1962).
25. John D . Caputo, The Weakness of God: A Theology of the Event
{yi\oon\\np.on,
I N ; Indiana University Press, 2006),
26. Daniel Colucciello Barber, On Diaspora: Christianity, Religion,
andSecularity
(Eugene, O R : W i p f & Stock, 2011).
27. Jiirgen M o l t m a n n , The Crucified God: The Cross of Christ as the Foundation
and Criticism of Christian Theology, trans. R. A . Wilson and John Bowden (Minneapolis,
M N ; Fortress Press, 1993), 87.
28. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, ed. John W . de Gruchy,
trans. Isabel Best et al. (Minneapolis, M N ; Fortress Press, 2010).
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foreigner, the refugee, the stranger, the marginalized figure - must lie
at the heart o f our self-identifications, even, and perhaps especially,
when they undo our identides from within. Such undertakings were
done of course while recognizing the inherent risk that we might repeat
the same mistakes i f we were again to fail to notice how we are never
able to construct an undeconstructible identity {the impossible dream
of the sovereign self). A new view on comparative studies, it could be
argued, began to cake hold o f us as the dialectic between self and other
became much more real than had been embodied beforehand. Previously exclusive historical and national narratives were forced to confront
their very concrete 'other'. I n this light, Theodor Adorno's refashioning
of dialectics into a 'negative' mode, which had a significant impact upon
Moltmann's theology and a number o f emergent contextual theologies,
would, to my mind, stand as one such exemplary moment.^'
Following this line of thought, Feter Admirand's Amidst Mass Atrocity and the Rubble of Theology: Searching for a Viable Theology may have
directly set out to reinvigorate the relevance o f theodicy for theological
reflection. However, his book ends up providing, in my opinion, an equal
or greater service that we should here call to the fore of the discussion:
recognizing the rubble o f theology points the way toward a humbler
theology, one attuned to the inherent fragmentation of both our thoughts
and our world, and one therefore focused on the suffering of others that
permeates every human existence. I believe that as such theology participates with both Nicholson and Adorno in trying to fashion a somewhat
negative dialecdc in the face of the disintegration of traditional borders
and boundaries. "When Admirand speaks of the 'rubble of theology' as
such, he imphes the performance o f theology in the midst of 'violence
and injustice', and as it finds a renewed sense of hope for the discipline
within the theological 'explanations and systems that have ultimately
failed to address or admit their loss'.^° This is a realization that will cause
him at points throughout the work to glance at the gaps or holes within
his own Catholic theological background, embracing rather than shunning such 'failures' as potential sites for dialogue with those many 'others'
who speak from 'outside' its perceived boundaries,
Beyond Admirand's take on theology today, another significant
voice, and one just as relevant to theological discourse, lies in the work
29. Theodor W . Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. E. B. Ashton (London: C o n tinuum, 1973). See roo the study o f this narrative at the origins o f contemporary political
theology as i t unfolds i n David Tracy, The Analogical Imagination:
Christian Theology
and the Culture of Pluralism (New York: Crossroad, 1998).
30. Admirand, Amidst Mass Atrocity and the Rubble of Theology, xv-xvi.
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of the Jewish philosopher Emmatiuel Levinas. There is a certain 'excess'
to our humanity, as Levinas once demonstrated, that unsettles us and
prompts us to try to reduce the 'Other' before us in ways that undermine
the 'Other's' very humanity. The Levinasian task, however, is to access
a revitalized notion of transcendence, but only as gained through the
immanent Other(ness) before us, a sort o f 'transcendence-in-immanence'
that characterizes his work throughout.^' In his work, though this simply
reiterates a point I find present underneath Nicholson's work as well,
care and responsibility toward the Other become inherently political
acts insofar as they directly call into question humanity's reliance upon
warfare and the dehumanization o f those who differ from the collective,
and warring, 'us'.
In this context, Nigel Zimmermann has pursued a discussion of rhe
nature o f hospitality in Levinas' work in relation to Christian theology,
as well as how 'evil' arises from a denial o f our responsibility for the
Other, that I f m d to be particularly helpful in this regard.According to
Zimmermann's reading, letting the Other present itself (him or herself)
to us is a strictly phenomenological exercise, and one that gives shape to
Levinas' philosophy, though it is also clear that, despite such an appearance, the Other is never fully known by us, and in fact remains permanently unknown in its radical otherness, calling us to act ethically in
defense o f its alterity. As such, the problem which humanity faces lies not
in trying to identify the Other — this is a distraction and even an abstraction that need not be performed, which is also a point that only bolsters
Nicholson's claims on the importance o f comparative theology - but in
ethically responding to the Other, a situation that brings into being a
certain permanently 'de-centered subjectivity'.^^ What Zimmermann
concludes is that Levinas disturbs theology, not as one who uncovers
decaying foundations and unreliable pillars, but as one who discovers the
poor man in the dark and wakes him up with warm clothes and food.
The provocation of Levinas is such that the poverty of one's own position
is unmasked, not for rhe sake o f puWic humiliadon, but for moving past
facades and healing the fragile body one finds there.^''
What I hear in this theological reading of Levinas is, again, the need
to move through the 'rubble' o f theology, not to strive for a seemingly
3 1 . See, e.g., Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority,
trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1969).
32. Nigel Zimmermann, Levinas and Tiieologf (London: Bloomsbur)' T & T Clark,
2013).
33. Ibid,, 24.
34. Ibid., 8 1 .
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unblemished, systematic or comprehensive defense o f an abstract transcendence that never existed as such in the first place, but to continue
emptying i t out, to 'impoverish' theology even fiirther. Our task as theologians, as Jean Vanier reminds us, is one of'littleness' and not of legitimating a sovereign politics that masquerades as a theological or religious
observation on the 'nature o f things'.^' Levinas, for his part, brings forth
a meditation on the 'littleness' of the faith of Israel in its desire to stick
to its own particular traditions and revelations, something o f the 'necessary humility' that Israel might accept in the face of God and those
Others standing before them.''' What he finds is that "The election of
the Jew, and the whole people of Israel, is a calling out of the self towards
the Other"^^ - a suggestion that opens up his entire philosophy toward
theology at the same time as it withdraws and challenges theology from
a certain distance. Providing a nice bridge between Levinas' philosophical and Jewish writings, Zimmermann points out how " [ . . . ] it is for
Levinas a central Jewish tenet that an authentic community of faith is
guided not by dogmatic content, let alone a theology, but by the selfsacrificial relationship o f persons."''^ T o think theology as a continuous
process of going beyond theology, perhaps as a kenotic theology that
pours itself out into other disciplines and other fields, is actually central
to doing theology — a practice that concretely appears as a form of weakness and, to some no doubt, of the loss of identity.
In truth, however, what is to be discovered there is only another
form of identity altogether, a true strength in what appears to be a
weakness, a point Saint Paul knew all too well, Zimmermann concludes
with the affirmation that God, according to Levinas, can be recovered
after the Shoah, but only in terms o f human inter-subjecrivity (hence,
comparatively), not through the reassertion o f an onto theological claim
concerning God's being. As such, "Theology is not itself a glory, but a
task in which the Other is glorified"^' — a proposition that theologians
still need to think through a good deal before they will be able to
proceed to the next phases o f theological insight. I n each o f these analyses, the task of theology is thoroughly comparative, or, in other words,
relational and transformational, and so will always be at once political,
social, philosophical, cultural and economic.

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Jean Vanier, Community and Growth, rev. ed. (New York: Paulist, 1989).
Z i m m e r m a n n , Levinas and Theology, 109.
Ibid., 125.
Ibid.
Ibid., 161.

D E V E L O P I N G A T H E O L O G I C A L L Y SELF-REFLEXIVE C R I T I Q U E

137

But how are we to access these roots o f theological self-critique
directly? W i l l such roots be entirely theological in origin, or will they
have come to us from other disciplines? Or, as I have already been suggesting, will there be little need to discern exactly where they come from
so long as chey are capable o f addressing the presence of a permanent
otherness within the theological? Are they perhaps as likely to derive
from the dialogues of comparative theological approaches brought about
external to a given religious cradition as they are from within it?

Pierre Bourdieu and a Self-reflexive Theology
I f Nicholson and Zimmermann call our attention to the inherendy
comparative or inter-subjective nature of theological inquiry, the work
of Pierre Bourdieu adds to the conversation a sense of how the individual
is able to comprehend their identity in relation to communal identity
and thereby to develop a self-reflexive form of understanding that theology might fmd useful. I n Bourdieu's analysis of mascuhne domination,
as but one example of where this takes place, and in his various attempts
to 'objecdfy objecdvity' or to strive for objectivity but realize too that
we will never be able to achieve it, we might find a suitable correlation
to what Judith Butler has been advocating as giving a critical account
of oneself This is to suggest the promotion of a certain sense of self
reflexivity in establishing one's personal identity.''" Taking his unending
40. O n the concept o f self-reflexiviry, see also A n t h o n y Giddens, The Constitution
of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration
(Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1990). Bourdieu's specific contribution to f o r m i n g a theological conception o f
self-reflexivity is explored i n D . F. Piiario, Bacl^ to the Rough Grounds of Praxis: Exploring
Theological Method with Pierre Bourdieu (Leuven: Leuven University Press and Peeters,
2005) and in T. H o w l a n d Sanks, "Homo Theologicus: Toward a reflexive theology (with
the help o f Pierre Bourdieu)," Theological Studies 68 (2007): 515-530. For a general
religious engagement w i t h Bourdieu's work, see Terry Rey, "Marketing the Goods o f
Salvation: Bourdieu on Religion," Religion 34 (2004); 331-343. I t should likewise be
noted that the continuity between Butler's position on hom(m)osociality leading to selfcritique and Bourdieu's notion o f self-reflexivity is, in a general sense, consistent, and
provides a unique opportunity ro transcend tradiriona) disciplinary boundaries i n the
hopes o f providing further justification for the theories presented by both authors. C f
Judith Butler, Gender Trouble ( L o n d o n : Routledge, 1999). Butler's own analysis o f
Bourdieu's work, despite her criticisms o f his depiction o f performativity, seems to i n d i cate thac such a correlation is indeed possible. See her article on Bourdieu entitled
"Performativity's Social Magic," i n Bourdieu: A Critical Reader, ed. Richard Shusterman
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), 113-128. A t the same rime, Bourdieu's analysis o f gender
relations is not without its complications and share o f critics. See, among others, Lisa
Adkins, "Reflexivity: Freedom or Habit o f Gender?," Theory, Culture and Society 20, 6
(2003): 21-42; H o w i e Chodos and Bruce Curtis, "Pierre Bourdieu's
Masculine
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attempts to establish reflexive identities within the many social contexts
in which he studied them, we can see how Bourdieu's account of selfreflexivity is not simply borne individually, but is that which is, as he
points out, collectively assessed; it is the step f r o m an T to a 'We' that
is essential to forming identity as such.'^' For Bourdieu, the roots o f
one's self-identification are to be traced to one's position in a collective
'we', engulfing the T and yet respecting its uniqueness so that an 'objective' view o f the self might emerge. Fulfilling the role which one's community has traditionally played, the 'collective', as he terms it, adapts
the practices of everyday life as a critical instance of regulating selfidentity. As he puts it, "Reflexivity takes on its full efficacy only when
it is embodied in collectives which have so much incorporated it that
they practise it as a reflex.'"*^ Such a reflex is intended to be a step
toward liberating each person o f the unconscious bias linked to their
social position(s), and fiom which issues the point o f view that has
become 'the illusion o f absoluteness' from which only a collective can
restore any 'objectivity'.^'
T o borrow a term normally associated with Butler's work, we might
say that the 'performance' o f one's identity is only critically engaged

Domination: A Critique," Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology 39, 4 (2002):
397-412; Jo-Anne Dillabough, "Class, Culture and the 'Predicaments o f iVIasculine
D o m i n a t i o n ' ; Encountering Pierre Bourdieu," British Journal of Sociology of Education
25, 4 (2004); 489-506; Bridget Fowler, "Reading Pierre Bourdieu's Masculine
Domination: Notes Towards an Intersectional Analysis o f Gender, Culture and Class," Cultural
Studies n, 3/4 (2003); 468-494; Johan Heilbron, "Reflexivity and Its Consequences,"
European Journal of Social Theoiy 2, 3 (1999); 298-306; Leslie McCall, "Does Gender
Fit? Bourdieu, Feminism, and Conceptions o f Social Order," Theory and Society 2 1 , 6
(1992): 837-867; Lois M c N a y , "Gender, Habitus and the Field; Pierre Bourdieu and
the Limits o f Reflexivity," Theoiy, Culture and Society 16, 1 (1999); 95-117; Gad Yair,
'"Vive la (Sexual) Revolution; T h e Political Roots o f Bourdieu's Analysis o f Gender,"
The Sociological Review 56, 3 (2008): 388-407. See also the critical essays gathered in
Feminism After Bourdieu, ed. Lisa A d k i n s and Beverley Skeggs ( O x f o r d : Blackwell,
2004).
4 1 . From a sociological standpoint, w i t h i n which Bourdieu locates himself, a
" [ . . . ] reflexive analysis must consider successively position i n the social space, position
in the field and position i n the scholastic universe. H o w , w i t h o u t surrendering to narcissistic self-indulgence, can one apply this programme to oneself and perform the sociology
o f oneself, one's self-socioanalysis, given that such an analysis can only be a starting point
and that the sociology o f the object that I am, the objectivation o f my point o f view, is
a necessarily collective task?" Pierre Bourdieu, "Sketch for a Self-analysis," in Science of
Science and Reflexivity, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge; Polity, 2004), 94. See also, i n
general, T o n y Schirato and Jen "Webb, "Bourdieu's N o t i o n o f Reflexive Knowledge,"
Social Semiotics 12, 3 (2002): 255-268.
42. Bourdieu, "Sketch for a Self-analysis," 114.
43. Ibid., 116.

D E V E L O P I N G A T H E O L O G I C A L L Y SELF-REFLEXIVE C R I T I Q U E

139

from a collective o f whicli one is a part.'*'^ The problems exposed by
this performative issue of one's subjectivity is, however, only part of a
larger representational schema o f power that Bourdieu is quick to deconstruct in his work as a whole, even, and perhaps more importantly for
self-reflective purposes, as it invests itself in his own disciplinary (sociological) boundaries.'*' This self-reflective gesture allows Bourdieu to
maintain that a struggle inherently lies at the center o f social analysis
itself one between those who unveil how their beliefs distort their perspective and those who have a vested interest in keeping those interests
purposely veiled. This is to say too that the
[...] relationship between [economic] distributions and [symbolic]
representations is both the product and the stake of a permanent
struggle between those who, because of the position they occupy
within the distriburions, have an interest in subverting them by modifying the classifications in which they are expressed and legitimated,
and those who have an interest in perpetuating misrecognition, an
alienated cognition that looks at the world through categories the
world imposes, and apprehends the social world as a natural world.'*''
In what can only seem like a direct homage to Butler's fundamental
insights concerning the parody and performance of gender, as well as
Nicholson's task of'de-naturalizing' as a form of'de-politicizing', what
appears as 'natural' to one social classification system may be a construct
wholly unnatural to the other it is placed upon, with the (designed)
intentions remaining unknown to those receiving such an imposition.
This is done, according to Bourdieu, for various reasons, most notably
to express the interests o f the dominant who are able to maintain
(hegemonic) control by obfuscating and masking the uses o f power and
authority. Taking critical action to counteract the imposition of a falsely
legitimated dominance, Bourdieu highlights however how social science
specifically must re-categorize its systematic analysis o f social structures
by maintaining a firm solidarity with the more subversive elements of its
study. This is potentially the case, he will argue, because the "specific
efficacy of subversive action consists in the power to bring to consciousness, and so to modify, the categories o f thought which help to orient
44. C f Butler, Gender Trouble, 171 ff.
45. See Bourdieu's remarkable performance o f the self-reflexivity possible w i t h i n
a university setting i n Pierre Bourdieu, Homo Academicus, trans. Peter Collier (Stanford,
C A : Stanford University Press, 1990), as well as his study o f the men f r o m his home
region o f France i n his Tlje Bachelors' Ball: The Crisis of Peasant Society in B^arn, trans.
Richard Nice (Chicago, I L : University o f Chicago Press, 2008).
46. Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, trans. Richard Nice (Stanford, C A ;
Stanford University Press, 1990), 140-141.
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individual and collecdve practices and, i n particular, the categories
through which distributions are perceived and appreciated.'"*''
In describing what might appear to many as an almost revolutionary attempt to subvert the dominant 'objective' order - yet one that, as
Hannah Arendt also observed, will not simply fade away with time, but
is rather inherent to humanity'*^ - he critiques this view strongly by
asserting that such criticism falls short o f objectivity,
[...] by failing to write into its theory of social classes the primary
truth against which it was conscructed, in particular the veil of symbolic relations without which, in many cases, class relations would
not be able to function in their 'objeccive' trurh as relations of exploitation. In other words, objectivism forgets that misrecognition of
the reality of class relations is an integral part of the reality of those
relations.'*'
This misrecognicion is what allows for a constitution of the daily activity
of most social networks. The logic o f practice, Bourdieu asserts, is precisely a logic of the everyday (e.g. from cooking and walking to marriage
and representations of time or gender) that believes in its own legitimacy
to the point that it can no longer recognize why it began believing this
logic in the first place.'" The person immersed in the social symbolic
space cannot in essence see outside or 'beyond' the structures that make
everyday life possible, and i t is on this condition o f forgetfulness that a
repetition o f the everyday subsists. This habitus — as the schema of the
everyday is here termed - produces a worldview that is dissociated from
its theoretical edifice. The everyday functions without a conscious
knowledge present as necessary to cause its operacion. This is nonetheless
how a person constructs their world, a construct that eludes theoretical
description, but nonetheless is total."
Those who live on the level o f the everyday, immersed in the habitus
and not on the level of feigned 'objectivity' therefore, i n Bourdieu's
words,
[...] can make nothing of universes that have not performed such a
dissociation and so have, as it were, an economy [of distribution and
representadon] in itself and not for itself Thus, any partial or total
objectification of the archaic economy chat does not include a theory
47. Bourdieu, The Logic
48. Hannah Arendt, On
49. Bourdieu, The Logic
50. This same extended
Outhne ofa Theoiy of Practice,
Press, 1977).
5 1 . Bourdieu, The Logic

of Practice, 141.
Revolution ( N e w York: Penguin, 2006).
of Practice, 136.
argument is put forward more concisely i n Bourdieu's
trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge: Cambridge University
of Practice,

76.
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of the subjective relation of misrecognition which agents adapted to
this economy maintain with its 'objective' (chat is, objectivist) truth,
succumbs to the most subtle and most irreproachable form of
ethnocentrism.'^
The economy that functions within a given worldview appears as the
only option, giving it an apparently inherent 'archaic' quality. This false
form of 'objectivity' that develops through economic relations becomes
the very backdrop of a particular worldview that refuses to acknowledge
its own deliberate misrecognitions and yet passes as the 'natural' habitus
in which a community is invested. This situation again (re)affirms the
fact, for Bourdieu, that one's habitus is believed in rather than objectively
viewed; it is as entirely personal as it is constituent o f one's identity and
therefore is liable to construct itself on the various 'blind spots' that i t
ignores. Bourdieu makes clear that belief is 'an inherent part of belonging' to a social field, one where the decision to enter it is less relevant
than how that field works upon the subject: "That is why one cannot
enter this magic circle by an instantaneous decision of the will, but only
by birth or by a slow process of co-option and initiation which is equivalent to a second b i r t h . " "
To avoid this 'ethnocentric' perspective (and I would here add that
the labels patriarchal, racist or heteronormative are likewise applicable
since these are formed much on the same basis), a critical form of selfreflexivity needs to be generated from luithin the bounds of each particular habitus, and not necessarily from without, something Bourdieu makes
evident. Yet the difficulty o f gaining a self-reflexive awareness within
these social networks, including theology (which is here my particular
focus ad intra), is thus particularly acute insofar as what is culturally
arbitrary often comes across i n these contexts as ' n a t u r a l ' . T h e s e networks are what maintain the particular 'nature' of the people who constitute its community and who come to 'believe' i n the integrity o f its
boundaries.
The demonstration o f a contrast between believing in rhe social
and cultural boundaries o f a community in general and believing in the
community which is the Church specifically, I would only add, is therefore doubly problematic. A t the heart o f the matter, there is often no
way pracdcally pronounceable in which to articulate differences in the

52. Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, 113.
53. Ibid., 68.
54. See Bourdieu, Musculiiie Domination,
Stanford University Press, 2001), 2.

trans. Richard Nice (Stanford, C A :
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structures o f believing, and thereby to differentiate, for example,
between belief in the Church as the body of Christ and belief in the
Church as social construct of security and identity. Making this distinction, however, as well as getting people within the Church to assume
the vital willingness to change their perspectives on such structures, is
necessary for transformations to occur on the path toward jusdce and
the greater expression of the truths that define a communal body of
believers.''
The plane of self-reflexivity is in general fraught with the tensions
of desire, of not wanting to alter that which in fact forms our personal
sense of self as Michel de Certeau pointed out some time ago."" This
reality also, no doubt, speaks directly to why a rejection of comments
critical to one's habitus often seems to be the norm. This reality is the
site, Bourdieu reminds us, where theology in particular has historically
developed an 'imaginary anthropology', "obtained by denial of all the
negations really performed by the 'economy'" of symbols and cultural
and pohtical representations.''' In Bourdieu's estimation, theologians in
particular would do well to register caution when dictating principles
that conflict with actual functioning economies within the world. This
is not, however, and as Bourdieu again reminds us, a justification of the
status quo, but a manner by which to unveil those imagined theological
anthropologies that might actually be sustaining an ideological, hegemonic and ethnocentric discourse at their core.
At the very least, these reflections should prompt us to reconsider
what ideological discourses lie embedded within the core o f Church
teachings or theological discourses, as well as the centrality given to doctrinal formuladons which, in this sense, perhaps serve rather as obstacles
to formulating a more accurate Christian conception of the body of
doctrine. For this very reason, Bourdieu's ardculation of a proper cridque of dominance should be revisited properly in relation to ecclesiastical structures. His warnings concerning dominance - first, that it must
appear as natural as possible, though working vaguely through the modes
of a feigned objectification; second, that i t is daily, personal and pervasive, going into rhe deepest levels of society in order to perpetuate itself
as by its nature dominance must; and third, that i f the specific manifest
55. The idea o f critiquing the Church as an institution is certainly not a new idea
in the history o f theology, f r o m Augustine's City of God to Avery Dulles' model o f the
Church as institution. See Avery Dulles, Models of the Church (New York: Image, 1991).
56. Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, trans. Steven Rendall (Berkeley,
C A : Universit)' o f California Press, 1984).
57. Bourdieu, The Logic of I'ractice, 134.
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institutions of dominance are not chemselves illustrated, we are in danger
of merely reinforcing their agendas — must not be placed aside and forgotten. Rather, they should be articulated and expressed even more
directly, and, we might add, with an ear toward more clearly expressing
the heart of what it means to deal with confessional religious truths.'^

Authority and Power
From Bourdieu's perspective, authority itself rests on an arbitrary
grounding, a foundation that will not be able to receive any external
legitimization and so must mask its 'nature'.'' For this reason, a drama
unfolds berween those who seek to conceal and those who seek to reveal
this 'secret' nature of authority. What Bourdieu wishes to do is not only
to engage in a deconstruction of the mechanisms of power and authority,
but also to lessen the violence that such a concealment could be said to
produce. This is what will characterize the background against which he
will seek to portray the tensions (of dominance and subordination)
between gendered representations, an example he took up on occasion.
Traditionally, those in positions o f dominance, themselves immersed in
power, have had a vested interest in concealing the grounds of their own
(sovereign) authority, a situation which often results in a certain circularity o f argumentation. Accordingly, the concealment o f authority's
arbitrariness becomes the main ruse o f dominance provided through the
lack o f justification given for power and its pronouncements.
This is encapsulated when Bourdieu alternately characterizes masculine speech — as only one prominent instance o f this tactic, but a
major one at that - as retaining dominance through its being an isolated
set o f verdicts, or pronunciations o f order (blessings and curses). Feminine speech, on the other hand, becomes that which subverts masculine
dominance though a comprehensive logic illustrating both a "questioning o f necessicy and an affirmation o f contingency."''" The latter, therefore, likewise allows, tolerates or even thrives on a certain ambiguity,
while the former tends toward a universalized, monolithic or polarized
speech. Theological discourse has certainly yet to catch up to Bourdieu's
58. Bourdieu, The Logic of Pritctice, 129-133. For a more detailed systematic look
at how male domination plays a central role i n societal constructs appearing as natural,
see Bourdieu's Masculine
Domination.
59. See Pierre Bourdieu, Pascalian Meditations, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 94.
60. Bourdieu, Masculine Domination,
70-71.
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analysis, especially when it is engaged in analyzing theological or dogmatic positions that often appear through what could only at times seem
to align itself w i t h the latter set of characteristics.
What further complicates matters a great deal, though, is not that
universalized statements should cease to be given - indeed they are in
some sense necessary for identity formation, its rites and rituals of institution''' - but rather that it would be a failure of theology not to distinguish speech acts o f domination from its other discourses. We might be
justified, for example, in asking i f male theologians in particular can
distinguish in their writings an act of masculine dominance, either in
verbal or physical form, from an act supposed to convey or interpret
God's word, both internally and externally. The difficulty in separating
motives, both individual and ecclesial, is quite large here, especially in
pastoral terms insofar as priests (as men) in the Catholic and Orthodox
traditions, for example, convey God's image in Christ. But it is essential
to distinguish these different registers in order to avoid performing a
continuous systemic violence upon both women and men,''^
The foundations for the use of such a force lie upon what Bourdieu
characterizes as a 'mystical' foundation for authority, the site from which
law itself is said to spring - a point affirmed by Jacques Derrida as well.'''
This brings us to inspecting the necessity of the force behind authority,
a force which can be either more or less violent. Bourdieu defines the
foundation for this authority as that which does not have an inherent
justification; i t only appears as the force itself which legitimates a
6 L See Bourdieu, Pascalian Meditations,
245.
62. Perhaps we can sense the difficulty o f removing the embeddedness o f patriarchal norms, the tactics o f masculine domination which Bourdieu speaks of, through an
historical, and strongly ecclesiological, example. John Paul II's apostolic letter Mulieris
Dignitatem, i n contrast to its normal method o f reference, citation and explanation to
justify its claims, simply states how it is 'commonly thought' that women are more attentive to others than men, using the phrase alone to justify its validity. John Paul I I ,
Mulieris Dignitatem, 15 August 1988, § 1 8 . Accessed online at http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-pauI-ii/en/apostJetters/I988/documents/hf_jp-ii_apLl98808I5_mulierisdignitatem.html. This phrase, and there are many others one could potentially cite f r o m
contemporary Catholic Church teaching in particular to illustrate the point, touches the
border o f the danger that Bourdieu refers to as the masculine practice of'dispensing w i t h
justification*, an act that can only be performed as such by those i n positions o f power
who seek to legitimate their authority through force alone. Bourdieu, Masculine
Domination, 9. This act, according to Bourdieu, is most often rendered as claims o f 'common
sense' which convert opinion into what is intended to appear as 'natural' w i t h i n a certain
context. Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Syiiibolic Power, ed. John B. Thompson, trans.
Matthew Adamson (Cambridge, M A ; Harvard University Press, 1991), 131. This is the
manner in w h i c h someone can be said to 'become' what they already are, recalling
Simone de Beauvoir's dictum that "one is not born, but becomes a woman." Simone de
Beauvoir, The Second Sex {^ew Yotk: Bantham, 1952), 249.
63. See Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, 49.
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particular, though thoroughly contingent, order. What is to disdnguish
this 'mystical' foundation in its mythological, religious or nationalistic
guises remains however less clear, and it is not an issue that is easily
addressed, though there is a great need to do so. There is little doubt,
however, that the 'force of law' which these symbolic utterances convey
necessarily resists the ambiguity of law's foundations in order to promote
identity through a stable social ordering, the symbolic ritual interests
which found the social boundaries o f cultural intelligibility.'''* Indeed,
the order which certain theological or ecclesial statements reinforce
through their promotion of specific norms often appear as fundamental
to resisting the structures o f 'sin' and 'chaos' which would otherwise
abound (or at least the fear o f such things abounds).
Many questions are also opened up by a general realization o f the
arbitrariness o f signifying claims as opposed to (ontological) truth
claims, and perhaps theology's failure in this regard has been simply to
follow suit in not making this distinction clearer, for it is precisely this
distinction between them that is essential for understanding difference
as constitutive of identity itself This distinction plays a pivotal role,
for example, in discerning the levels of responsibility apparent in the
usage o f a signifying power, such as when we ask: what justice could
possibly be done in redrawing the line(s) between identities elsewhere
than the prevailing current norms? W h o benefits f r o m these juridical
(re)drawings, perhaps in many ways analogous to the political practice
of gerrymandering? W h o is thereby included or excluded? What types
of arguments for increased representation w i l l be acceptable (or heard)
and for what reasons will this be so? I n short, who stands to lose power
and who to gain i t by signifying things differendy? I would only add
at this juncture that we might note as well the significance potentially
open to hybrid identities and those contexts where instances of muldplebelonging arise, mainly, f r o m comparative theological studies and
which are yet central to our discussion of what constitutes the subject
matter o f theology proper.'''

64. See Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, 11 Sff. See also the affinity which
Bourdieu's use o f the phrase 'force o f law' shares w i t h Jacques Dernda's usage in his essay
"Force o f Law: The 'Mystical Foundation o f A u t h o r i t y ' , " in Acts of Religion, ed. G i l
Anidjar, trans. M a r y Quaintance ( L o n d o n : Routledge, 2002).
65. O n hybrid identities, see, among others, H o m i K. Bhabha, The Location of
Culture (London: Routledge, 1994); on multiple belonging, see, in particular. Rose
Drew, Buddhist and Christian^ An Exploration of Dual Belonging (London; Routledge,
2011). For a contestation o f gendered binary categorizations, w h i c h I feel is highly relevant in this context, see, e.g., J u d i t h Butler, Undoing Gender (London: Routledge,
2004).

146

COLBY D I C K I N S O N

The lack o f justification for an utterance which conveys the 'force
of law' can be seen as a necessity for social order, yet it is not one which
is removed from all cridque; indeed, its reladon to 'Truth' may remain
at times completely unstated, though needing perhaps to be the thing
stated most clearly of all. In ali of this, the essential question remains: to
what degree does a contingently established order seek to promote justice
(thereby lessening the violence it perpetuates) and not simply to legitimate its own dominance (thereby increasing rhe violence it performs).'
Bourdieu's efforts to develop a 'non-violent' communication, attempdng
to 'reduce as much as possible the symbolic violence exerted', provides
no easy oudet that would negate all responsibility for the violences that
are committed in order to establish cultural legibility.'''' In the end, there
is no simple (absolute) polarization possible in order to conduct a litmus
test for violence, only a sliding scale which implicates all inasmuch as
each discourse expresses new avenues for potential liberation as well.
What we are left with then, as I noted in the beginning, is an embodied
tension from which we cannot simply be removed.

Entertaining Religious Self-reflexivity
Following from this analysis of just how the symbolic language of dominance exerts its force, we see too how, for Bourdieu, an abstraction is a
generalization, a thought-construct that is less fact than vaguely founded
claim. To perform an act o f abstraction is in some sense to perform a
certain violence, to perform a reduction of the robust elements which
comprise a more naturally complex scenario. A t the same dme, however,
he recognizes that "[t]here is no politics of pure particularity."'''' Universal statements are the eventual outcome of a particular posidon, a necessary abstraction of sorts, which coalesce upon the horizon of what constitutes the 'polidcal' in the first place. Their use, however, though
inevitable, should be guarded and used with caution, for at their worst,
abstractions become, in another sense, tools of the purely ideological.
In fact, the ideological use of abstraction results from what Bourdieu
characterizes as a universalized position which seeks to remove itself from
its particular context, thus refusing to 'objectify' its own objectivity. The
66. Pierre Bourdieu, et al., The Weight ofthe World: Social Suffering in Contemporary Society, trans. Priscilla Parkhurst Ferguson et al. (Oxford; Polity, 1999), 609.
67. Ernesto Laclau, "Constructing Universality," i n Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau
and Slavoj Zizek, Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the
Left (London; Verso, 2000), 305.
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violence which results is the violence o f asserting a universal statement
as the only form o f one's particularity, thereby effacing the traces o f the
particular which would be seen as a contamination of a 'purer' universal
rationale.''^ Situated w i t h i n the confines o f these remarks, we might
then, as a task sdll in need o f much explanation beyond simply inquinng
as to the particularides o f a certain abstracted theological position which
professes to understand or define the norms o f other contextual positions, elaborate upon what defines the embodied posidon from which
specific theological writings or positions emerge. That is, what allows a
theologian to proceed in their work as i f their own autobiographical
context did not matter?
We might take, for example, the Pope John Paul II's letter on the
'dignity' of women, Mulieris Dignitatem, that does not first take into
account the posidons of the men who wrote it. In the absence of such a
letter on men and their role(s) in society f r o m a theological perspective,
though there have been critical voices which call for such a letter to be
written,''' for example, we are left to assume that the letter on collaboration between genders in a Catholic context promotes a universalized
speech which yet must fail in some sense to account for its own (sexual)
particularity, thus running the nsk o f condoning or insdgadng an unacknowledged but felt violence.^" From another angle, we might also
68. Bourdieu, Masculine Domination,
62.
69. See Camilla J. Kari, Public Witness: The Pastoral Letters of the American Catholic
Bishops (ColIegeviUe, M N : Lirurgical Prejis, 2004), 127.
70. M y analysis here almost reaches a definitive (though almost ironic) moment
as the letter in question, Mulieris Dignitatem, the one which does exist on the collaboration o f genders, propounds and disseminates what could only be described as a series o f
abstractions, though ones that are not altogether unaware (in some sen.se at least) o f their
being abstractions. A n d therein lies the difficulty o f discerning their meaning, or even i f
there is a deeper irony present in their articulation. T h e potential for irony is in fact great
as the 'force' o f these statements does seem to be invested primarily in generating and
confirming the socially dominant (perceived) boundaries o f gender identity thtough a
series o f abstractions. For example, it is said that women have a unique 'capacity for the
other', they 'preserve the deep i n t u i t i o n o f goodness i n their lives o f those actions which
elicit life', they are marked by a 'capacity to give life' (i.e. motherhood), they 'acquire
maturity very quickly', they hold a 'sense and a respect for what is concrete', they 'possess
a singular capacity to persevere i n adversity, to keep life going even i n extreme situafions,
CO hold tenaciously to the future, and finally to remember w i t h tears the value o f every
human life', and chey are 'opposed to abstractions which are so fatal for the existence o f
individuals and society'. A certain reductionism, no doubt, takes place here, and it is one
yet intended co safeguard a woman's freedom chough perhaps w i t h che (un)incentional
consequence o f limiting it i n other ways. So then, we have, i n some sense, a series o f
abstractions issued i n order to avoid the 'fatal abstractions' which do harm to che exiscence o f boch individuals and society, a series w h i c h draws a distinction berween the
different forms o f abstraction possible, some o f w h i c h the Church apparently does find
itself willing to create, at lease i f we are Co cake this letter at face value. I t is not, however.
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inquire as to how a universalized statement could be issued without yet
denying its particular grounding, and, furthermore, how that foundation
sustains such a universalized position.
The violence done in pursuing such a false form of 'objectivity' is
potentially double: not only are there those who become marginalized
within a dominant paradigm, but there are even those within a dominant position itself who must marginalize, or repress, parts of themselves
in order to become more 'objecdve', or more 'universal'. This reality is
something which Bourdieu himself has linked to the role of priests
through the act of 'becoming holy', a process that threatens to detach a
man from his own social sense of 'being a man' in a given context (and
along with whatever such a thing entails).^' The problem, again, is not
simply that a form o f universality is presented in the form of an abstracdon, but that a form of universality is presented as the site of its own
particularity, as i f no other historical-empirical context grounded its
articulation. This is what Bourdieu calls the 'eternalization' of a particular position seeking to deny its particularity.^^
Perhaps we should be seeking, rather as Bourdieu suggests, a project which attempts to 'objectify objectivity' itself - that is, to recognize
how the tensions we are caught in will never really go away.''' This
would be to engage in an always asymptotic progression toward truth
and justice, respecting the limitations which humanity has before it and
unmasking the failures of attempting to be truly 'objective' and therefore at a remove f r o m one's own humanity, which would be to perform
a perverse act o f violence to one's self Like the evolution o f a language
which can become less racist or sexist over time, the individual can learn
to eradicate such violences by allowing the repressed elements of what
appears as entirely subjective to appear and to be integrated with the
always already constructed narratives which comprise an individual's
worldview.'''*

entirely clear what type o f abstraction is being propounded here, or whether a difference
in types o f abstraction is truly being asserted (as this document itself argues needs to be
done) or whether the letter has accidentally slipped into a deeply ironic and contradictory
position. O n this point at least the temptations to obfuscate are high and the needed
clarity still much sought after.
7 1 . Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, 212-213 and 248.
72. Bourdieu, Masculine Domination,
82 and Pascalian Meditations, 48.
73. See also Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice.
74. There is an intentional overlap here w i t h the work o f Luce Irigaray on the
role o f language in evoking culturally established sexist positions. See Luce Irigaray, To
Speak Is Never Neutral, trans. Gail Schwab (London: C o n t i n u u m , 2002).
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In the end, this 'double bind' o f power exerts a certain circular
logic, one that pronounces unity at the same time as it produces deeper
divisions, that is, as it forms an attempt to liberate while simultaneously
imposing other restrictions. What this means is that power, as noted
above, in its 'mystical' foundations, engages in a certain circularity in
order to legitimate and regulate its usage - it has no foundadon to stand
upon except the one it creates (and thus 'naturalizes' itself through this
very act).^' As Bourdieu notes, this is the 'perfect circularity' expressed in
the cycles o f honor between men, an indication of its arbitrary nature
through the various lines o f its succession.'''' This is perhaps nowhere
better exemplified than in the usage of symbolic language within certain
theologies and within the Church, a terrain, as Bourdieu notes, which
especially demonstrates the capacities for violence which a pardcular discourse could be said to utilize, even i f I might add, done under the rubric
of 'apostolic succession' or working within a canonized set of authors.
Bourdieu does occasionally hint that the maintenance o f religious
dogma, despite its at times arbitrary nature, is a necessity for providing
social order as it aids the construction o f the habitus that regulates our
everyday realities. For this reason, he states that awareness alone of an
arbitrary norm will not produce an effective change in social relations.
Any perceived awareness must be accompanied by a corresponding
change in the habitus, the practices o f the body which function according to a knowledge o f their own — this is the only way in which to
break its circular justification o f its own authority.'''^ A n d this is to be
done over and against the fact that symbolic power is constantly
engaged in acts which serve either to secure or to betray the foundations for trust and belief; symbolic power indeed defines the conditions
upon which we can be said to believe in the first p l a c e . T h e r e is thus
a belief in the teachings that constitute its universality or catholicity,
but also a belief in the body that constitutes its everyday reality, the
masses of persons who i n f o r m its particularity. Again, such is its circular nature.

75. See, among others, the critique offered i n Jacques Derrida, The Beast and the
Sovereign, vol. 1, ed. Michel Lisse, Marie-Louise Mallet and Ginette M i c h a u d , trans.
Geoffrey Bennington (Chicago, I L : University o f Chicago Press, 2009), 42.
76. Bourdieu, Masculine Domination,
49.
77. See Bourdieu, Pascalian Meditations, 9. I n this regard, there are several helpful
parallels present i n Richard Terdiman, Body and Story: The Ethics and Practice of Theoretical Conflict (Baltimore, M D : Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005).
78. Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, 28 and 170.
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What this also means, however, is that to break the circularity o f
established power relations, one must perform a self-reflexive act, either
on the everyday level of the habitus or on the theoretical level of abstracdon. This distinction introduces an important qualification within an
understanding of the Church as the body of Christ. That is, in order for
the Church to (re)shape its own body, it must be attentive to this bifurcated reality, and so thereby disdnguish berween belief in a social body
and belief in the body o f Christ, and in no way simply renounce the
necessity o f social and political representadons. This is something that
can i n reaUty be done without the need for a full-scale R/reformation.
In other words.
Theology [...] can be understood [...] as a field of struggle for power
to control the capital at stake, that is, the Christian symbol system.
Conflicts in the field are not "merely theological," but also involve
struggles for power. Somebody's interest is being served or undermined [...]. There is no disinterested theology. To pretend otheiwise
is to disguise and thereby legitimate those interests.^'
T. Howland Sanks' comments on Bourdieu's applicability to the field o f
theological discourse are deeply resonant with the overall aims of this
study, for not only does Bourdieu assist in seeing the need for a selfreflexive theological discourse, but he also utilizes his critique in order
to point toward notions o f a 'pure love' as formed i n the home, between
persons intimately connected, those who are democratically overcoming
structural forms o f domination, and coming to the center stage perhaps
in deference to the often non-rational means o f overcoming political
obstacles.^" Like Charles Taylor's exploration of 'networks of agape'
in his A Secular Age, what Bourdieu points toward with his notion of
'pure love' is an almost Utopian hope that non-subordinated relations
might exist in contexts where self-reflexive critique abounds, no matter
whether this is locatable in one's home, family, the Church, another
inscitudon or society on the whole. There is no 'purer' expression possible for either theologians or ecclesial efforts to assist i n locating the site
of 'pure love' it has claimed, and must continue to claim, to lead people
toward no matter where it is to be found. The Church, from its own
foundations, must search only to locate such a love within itself

79. Sanks, "Homo Theologicus^ 529-530.
80. C f Deborah Reed-Doanahay, Locating Bourdieu
University Press, 2005), 118.

(Bloomington, I N : Indiana
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Conclusion
What 1 suggest concerning this quest to establish the self-reflexive foundations of theological practice is that theologians must learn to be attentive to the often, but not always, exclusive nature o f naming, labeling,
drawing boundaries and forming identities. They must learn to embrace
the inherent (comparative) relationahty o f doing theology, which also
means that they can re-draw or re-negodate these reladons so as not to
be as exclusionary as they, or the Church, had previously been. T o return
to our beginning, perhaps theology needs to take the comparative
approach to theology much more seriously than it has ever done, not
only to become increasingly aware o f its limitations, but to realize that
theologians always speak from particular, embodied contexts. Only by
doing this will theology be able to deal with the reality of pluralism, dual
belonging, the political formation o f everyday theologies and a host of
other complex realities in ways that more 'disciplinary' efforts are not
able to. Theologians must learn, then, to be flexible in ways professional,
guild theologians are often not.^' The theological resources for transformation in this regard are everywhere present. This may take place on the
level o f the seen or the unseen, the thought or the unthought. Or it can
be a learning to 'see' beyond both levels, a seeing beyond, a thinking
beyond. First, as in the end, theology must see itself as much as it sees
beyond itself
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